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Introduction
Man is by nature a social animal, and society's maintenance requires
the existence of laws.1 Laws may vary between societies because they
reflect different social backgrounds. Scholars note that an observer cannot
sufficiently understand his own legal system without comparing it to a dif-
ferent legal system. 2 Thus, a comparative method illuminates variations in
legal conceptions and enhances one's understanding of the nature of law
itself.3 With that in mind, this Article presents a comparative study of con-
tract law, focusing on the problem of delay in the contract formation pro-
cess. The paradigmatic case of our concern is as follows: A buyer receives
an offer for the sale of goods on September 10, 2004. The offer prescribes,
"If the offeree wants to accept the offer, a message of acceptance must be
received by October 1, 2004." Since the written offer clearly prescribes the
due date of receipt, the buyer mails a letter of acceptance on September 20,
2004. If the transmission were normal, the letter of acceptance would
reach the seller before October 1, 2004. However, the seller actually
receives the letter of acceptance on October 10, 2004. 4
Legal systems approach the problem of delay in the transmission of
acceptances differently. In common law systems, there has been "no occa-
sion" to confront this problem because the "mailbox rule" makes the
acceptance effective when it is sent.5 By contrast, many civil law codes
with "receipt rules" have legislative provisions that deal with delays in the
transmission of acceptance. 6 This suggests that legal rules addressing the
problem may be necessary in legal systems that have rules making accept-
ance effective when received, but that such rules may not be necessary in
legal systems that have rules making acceptance effective when sent. How-
ever, in common law systems such as in the United States, the mailbox rule
does not govern every case.7 For example, the mailbox rule does not gov-
ern when the offeror, like the seller in our paradigm case above, has so
1. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. I, ch. II, § 9 (Ernest Barker trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1948); ROScoE POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW (1951) [hereinafter POUND, JUSTICE];
see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 694-95 (2d ed. 1985)(stating that "[if law means an organized system of social control, any society of any
size and complexity has such systems"); RoscoE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHI-
LOSOPHY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1965) [hereinafter POUND, PHILOSOPHY] (developing the notion
of law as a form of social control).
2. See P.S. ATYAH & R.S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY, AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 418
(Clarendon Press 1987).
3. See id. at 415-20.
4. Hereinafter labeled as "paradigm case."
5. JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 198 (3d ed. 1999).
6. Id.
7. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 2.23, at 107
(4th ed. 1998).
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prescribed in his offer.8 This creates an issue concerning the meaning of
"no occasion" to deal with the problem. Additionally, this creates an issue
concerning the desired solution. To answer these questions, it will be use-
ful to compare the contract formation process in the American legal system
with that in the Japanese legal system. Both the Civil Code of Japan, unlike
many civil law jurisdictions, and the American legal system generally make
an acceptance effective when sent. However, unlike the American system,
the Civil Code has a legal rule which governs the problem of delay in the
transmission of acceptance. 9
The comparative study shows that American contract law focuses on
the different legal identities of the contracting parties, viewing one as the
"master of the offer"'1 and the other as the "casting voter."'" In contrast,
Japanese contract law views them equally or "symmetrically." 12 Neither
the chronological order of the establishment of the offer and acceptance
nor the different status of offeror and offeree has any legal significance
under the civil law in Japan. 13 The comparative study also shows that the
American legal system has developed its characteristic rules which balance
the parties' interests-either by protecting the offeree from the power of the
master of the offer, or by protecting the offeror from the power of the cast-
ing voter. In contrast, the Japanese legal system has developed institutions
that control the means of acquiring the casting vote. The balancing of the
parties' interests is not only a particularly American approach to the con-
tract formation process, but also a major function of American contract
law, especially when an unforeseen circumstance occurs.
14
Since American contract law generally has appropriate mechanisms
for balancing contracting parties' interests, it is understandable that there
has been no occasion to provide a definitive approach to solving the prob-
lem of delayed acceptances. Nonetheless, it is necessary for American law
8. "The offeror, it must be remembered, is master of his offer and so he has power
to negate the mailbox rule." Id. at 117.
9. Minpo, the Civil Code of Japan, makes an acceptance effective when it is sent,
MINPO, art. 526, para. 1; yet it has a provision to deal with the problem of delay in the
transmission of acceptances. Id. at art. 522. Different arguments may be available in
both the United States and Japan when the contracting parties use "instantaneous"
methods of communication, such as email. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Electronic Con-
tracting: Legal Issues, 14 JOHN MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 211 (1996).
10. The phrase "master of his offer" can be seen in RESTATEMENT §§ 29 cmt. a, 52
cmt. a, 58 cmt. a.
11. See Kagayama, infra note 12, at 546-49.
12. See Shigeru Kagayama, Tetsuke no Hoteki Seishitsu-Moshikomi no Yuin, Yoyaku to
Tetsuke no Kankei, in MINPOGAKLU NO KADA! TO TENBO 543 (2000); infra notes 42-65 and
accompanying text.
13. See Kagayama, supra note 12, at 547-48. According to the accepted translation
of the Japanese Civil Code, "in order to form a contract, it is an indispensable require-
ment that some manifestations of intent which is opposed to each other agrees [sic]
(assent). In order to establish an assent, objective agreement and subjective agreement
are necessary." SAXME WAGATSUMA, SAIKEN KAKURON 54 (1954). The author cites many
German legal terms in his treatise.
14. See Robert A. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual Relations, 68
CORNELL L. REv. 617 (1983) (revealing the significance of the balancing approach in
American contract law by focusing on the problem of cessation).
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to confront specifically the problem of such a delay because an unforeseen
delay in the transmission of an acceptance creates an imbalance, which
does not stem from the difference between the offeror and the offeree,
between the parties. The following hypothetical demonstrates the imbal-
ance. Suppose prices increase sharply on October 1st in the paradigm
case: If there is no rule for the problem of delayed transmission of accept-
ances, such an acceptance is considered a counteroffer, allowing the origi-
nal offeror to speculate in a fluctuating market. Courts, however, have
strongly resisted sanctioning parties' attempts to speculate. 15
Cases for which there is no judicial precedent must be governed by the
"general principle, applicable to cases most nearly analogous, but modified
and adapted to new circumstances, by considerations of fitness and propri-
ety, of reason and justice, which grow out of those circumstances." 16
Thus, the rationale used to develop the rule addressing a delay in the trans-
mission of offers is similarly applicable to the problem of a delay in the
transmission of acceptances. This is so because an offeror in the case of a
delayed transmission of an acceptance is in an analogous position to an
offeree in the case of a delayed transmission of an offer to the extent that
the imbalances in both cases do not stem from the difference between the
offeror and the offeree, but from the difference between the addressor and
the addressee of the acceptance. This Article argues that the rule governing
delay should provide that, when the offeror has reason to know that the
acceptance has been timely sent, but it arrives late due to an unforeseen
delay in transmission, the delayed acceptance is effective, unless the offeror
promptly informs the offeree of his intention to retract the offer on account
of the delay.
Interestingly, Japan's legislative provisions stipulate the same rule but
result from a different rationale. 17 While the common law reaches the
solution by invoking "good faith,"'18 the Civil Code of Japan reaches the
solution by appealing to the "security or stability of transaction[s]." 19
American contract theory is closely related to "the free market of classical
economic theory, '20 while Japanese contract theory deems the principle of
good faith to be the "supreme notion" governing the entire law of obliga-
tion.2 1 In the American legal system, most commentators agree that the
concept of good faith does not become relevant until the contracting par-
15. See HONNOLD, supra note 5, at 197 n.2.
16. Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Maine R.R., 67 Mass. 263, 267-68 (1854).
17. See MINpo art. 522.
18. Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195 (1968).
19. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.1 (2d ed. 1998); The
Civil Code Draft Amendment Statement of Reasons, reprinted in MINPO SHuSEAN (ZENSAN PEN) NO RIYusHo, 503 (Toshio Hironaka ed., 1987). Although a literal translation of
the Statement of Reason would be "security of [commercial] transaction," it seems better
translated in this way.
20. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 7-8 (1974).
21. WAGATSUMA, SAIKEN KAKURON, supra note 13, at 33; SAKAE WAGATSUMA, SHINTEI
SAIKEN SORON 14 (1964). This treatise advances the traditionally accepted theory of con-
tract in Japan.
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ties have reached an agreement. 22 This antipathy toward good faith stems
from a fear that expanding the domain of good faith would subvert the
security or stability of commercial transactions. 23 Thus, one must find the
meaning of "good faith" and "security or stability of transactions" in the
contract laws, which touches on the more fundamental inquiries into the
nature of contract law and its role in society. Consequently, this Article
reconsiders the nature of contract law in exploring a solution to the prob-
lem of delay in the contract formation process.
Part I of this Article briefly reviews the structure of the several differ-
ent types of American law applicable to our paradigm case. Part II of this
Article compares the legal structure of the contract formation process in
the American legal system with that in the Japanese legal system. Then,
Part III analyzes legal consequences of a delayed transmission of an accept-
ance, which reflect the characteristics of the American legal system that are
discussed in the preceding Part. Part IV reconsiders the nature of contract
law as it appears in the solution to the problem of delay in the contract
formation process.
I. Law Applicable to the Problem of Delay in the United States
A. Structure of Applicable Law
In the American legal system, contract law is primarily common law,
consisting of court decisions, which differ from state to state. 24 Further,
many legislative enactments, which also vary from state to state, regulate
contracts.25 Despite these variations, uniformity of rules across jurisdic-
tions is highly valued in the field of contract law.26 Thus, courts find the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts legally more persuasive than Restate-
ments in other areas of law.2 7 Similarly, the promulgation of uniform
codes-such as the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") 28 and the Conven-
22. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 19, § 7.17 (stating that a court will supply a term
only if "an agreement is already in existence"). The duty of good faith is therefore not
imposed on parties until they have reached an agreement.
23. Jacques Ghestin & Barry Nicholas, The Pre-Contractual Obligation To Disclose
Information, in CONTRACT LAW TODAY: ANGLO-FRENCH COMPARISONS 188 (Donald Harris
& Denis Tallon eds., 1989).
24. See ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.21, at 75 (rev. ed. 1993); NoRIo
HIGUCHI, AMERIKA KEIYAKU Ho 27 (1994); see also ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILL.
MAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATIONS 26 (4th ed. 2001) (stating that "[miost of the
law giving legal effect to agreements is common law made by courts").
25. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 7, § 1.6, at 15.
26. See CORBIN, supra note 24, at 37.
27. See id. at 37 n.28 (1994), citing Yoshiaki Nomura, America Keiyaku Teishoku Ho
no Saikin no Doko, 40 HANDAi HOGAKU 924 (1991).
28. The UCC is an example of a collection of so-called "uniform state laws." It is the
result of attempting to achieve uniformity or generalization of the laws in every state by
way of adopting a same model rule in each state's legislature. The National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws began the attempts in 1982. The UCC has
been one of the most successful examples of these attempts. See HIGUCHI, supra note 24,
at 28 n.10.
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tion on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods ("CISG") 29 -has been
favored in the area of contract law.3 0 The UCC was enacted in 1951,
amended in 1958, and adopted by every state, except Louisiana, by
1962.31 Despite its name, the UCC governs not only contracts between
merchants but also contracts for the sale of goods in general. 32 Thus, the
UCC governs the paradigm case. 3 3 The United States has signed and rati-
fied the CISG, an international treaty.3 4 It is a "self-executing treaty with
the preemptive force of federal law,"'35 which, sets out substantive provi-
sions of law that govern the formation of international sales contracts and
the rights and obligations of the buyer and the seller.3 6 The CISG applies
to sales contracts between parties who conduct business in different coun-
tries bound by the Convention. 37 When it applies, the CISG preempts
state law, including Article 2 of the UCC. This avoids a situation where the
availability of independent state contract causes of action might be availa-
ble and might "frustrate the goals of uniformity and certainty embraced by
the CISG. ' 3 8
Article 2 of the UCC does not specifically say when a sales contract is
formed. 39 Rather, the fundamental principles governing contract forma-
tion are derived from the common law concepts of offer, acceptance, and
rejection.40 Note that the CISG applies if the seller in the paradigm case
conducts business in the United States and the buyer conducts business in
Canada, even if they are incorporated in the same state.4 ' When both con-
tracting parties conduct business in the United States, the common law
governs the problem of delay. However, when the contracting parties con-
duct business in two different countries, the CISG applies.
B. Priority of the Applicable Law
In the American legal system, the law that courts should apply and the
law courts actually apply may not be the same. The American system is
unique because of the frequency of circumstances under which judges are
authorized to "override" legislation.4 2 For example, in McIntosh v. Mur-
29. UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.97/19 (1980), published in 52 Fed. Reg. 6262 (1987) [hereinafter CISGI.
30. See HIGUCHI, supra note 24, at 28 n.10.
31. Louisiana has adopted part of the UCC but not Article 2, which governs con-
tracts for the sale of goods. See id.
32. See id. at 29.
33. See id.
34. See Asante Techs., Inc. v. PMC-Sierra, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1146 (N.D.
Cal. 2001).
35. Richard E. Speidel, The Revision of UCC Article 2, Sales in Light of the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 16 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 165, 166 (1995).
36. CISG, supra note 29.
37. Id.
38. See Asante Techs., Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1151; Speidel, supra note 35, at 167.
39. See Nimmer, supra note 9, at 220.
40. See id.
41. See Asante Techs., 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1147.
42. See ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 43.
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phy,4 3 the Supreme Court of Hawai'i avoided applying the Statute of
Frauds by interpreting a promise that was not to be performed within one
year as equivalent to a promise not performable within one year.4 4 The
court declared that "in spite of whatever utility the Statute of Frauds may
still have, its applicability has been drastically limited by judicial construc-
tion," and noted that "learned writers continue to disparage the Statute."'45
The judicial affinity for overriding legislation may result from the belief
that "instead of a series of detailed practical rules, established by positive
provisions," the common law consists of "a few broad and comprehensive
principles, founded on reason, natural justice, and enlightened public pol-
icy."'46 Therefore, to find a legally effective solution to the problem of delay
in the American legal system, one should identify the few broad principles
in governing the contract formation process.
II. Comparative Study of the Contract Formation Process
A. Legal Structure of the Contract Formation Process
1. Structure of the Contract Formation Process Under the Common Law
Under American law, a legal relationship does not evolve into a con-
tract until the two contracting parties engage in the voluntary acts of offer
and acceptance. 4 7 An offer is defined as "the manifestation of willingness
to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understand-
ing that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it,"48 or "an
act whereby one person confers upon another the power to create contrac-
tual relations between them."'4 9 An acceptance is defined as "a manifesta-
tion of assent to the terms thereof made by the offeree in a manner invited
or required by the offer,"5 0 or "a voluntary act of the offeree whereby he
exercises the power conferred upon him by the offer, and thereby creates
the set of legal relations called a contract. ' 5 1 Under the common law, the
offeror is generally the "master of his offer."5 2 Just as the offeror can avoid
making an offer by appropriate language or conduct, the offeror can nar-
rowly limit the offeree's power of acceptance. 53 Because the offeror has an
advantage over the offeree in the contract formation process, the law seeks
43. See McIntosh v. Murphy, 469 P.2d 177 (Haw. 1970).
44. Id. at 181. A similar tendency can be seen in other contract cases. See Hill v.
Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
45. See McIntosh, 469 P.2d at 180.
46. See Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Maine R.R., 67 Mass. 267 (1854).
47. Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations,
26 YALE LJ. 169, 170-71 (1917).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
49. Corbin, supra note 47, at 181.
50. RESTATEMENT § 50.
51. Corbin, supra note 47, at 199.
52. The phrase "master of his offer" can be seen in RESTATEMENT §§ 29 cmt. a, 52
cmt. a, 58 cmt. a.
53. RESTATEMENT § 29 cmt. a.
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to protect the offeree.5 4 It is not uncommon to find sections in a contract
treatise covering "protection of the offeree," but it is highly uncommon to
find sections addressing "protection of the offeror" in the same treatise. 55
The common idea linking these definitions is that the offer creates a
power that binds both parties, and that an acceptance is an exercise of that
power. Therefore, "[tihe offeror has, in the beginning, full power to deter-
mine the acts that are to constitute acceptance."'5 6 However, after the
offeror makes that determination, "the legal consequences thereof are out
of his hands, and he may be brought into numerous consequential rela-
tions of which he did not dream, and to which he might not have con-
sented." 57 At least under the common law of the United States, this
characteristic makes contract formation distinguishable from other factual
negotiations. 58 Thus, once the offeror extends his offer, the offeree has an
advantage over the offeror in the contract formation process. Foreign
scholars often emphasize the offeree's advantage in the common law,
5 9
that when closing a deal, the offeree has a "casting vote."'60 The unique
character of the offeror and the offeree under the American common law
will be clearer when we compare these definitions with the understanding
of the character of the offeror and offeree in civil law jurisdictions.
2. Structure of the Contract Formation Process from a Comparative
Perspective
In both the Japanese and the American legal system, an offer and an
acceptance generally form a contract. 61 However, in the Japanese system,
most scholars consider an offer to be a manifestation of intent that is sym-
metrical to acceptance. 62 Neither the chronological order of the offer and
acceptance, nor the different status of the offeror and offeree, possesses the
same legal significance under Japanese civil law that they do under Ameri-
can common law.63 This symmetrical understanding of offer and accept-
ance is also incorporated into the CISG, "which represents a series of
compromises between common law and civil law notions.''64 For example,
under the common law in the United States, the offeror has the power to
54. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 19, §§ 3.23-3.26c (referring to these sections
as "Protections of the Offeree").
55. See id.
56. Corbin, supra note 47, at 199.
57. Id. at 200.
58. See id. at 199-200.
59. See HIGUCHI, supra note 24, at 110-19 (stating that the offeree is in an ex ante
advantageous position). See generally Kagayama, supra note 12 (explaining that offer
and acceptance are not equivalent and that the acceptor is in an advantageous position
because he has absolute power over whether a contract comes into being).
60. Kagayama, supra note 12, at 546-49.
61. See MINPO arts. 521-28; WAGATSUMA, SAIKEN KAKURON, supra note 13, at 56.
62. Kagayama, supra note 12, at 546-49.
63. Id. at 547-48; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
64. See CORBIN, supra note 24, § 3.24, at 445.
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exclude default rules.65 However, in the Japanese legal system and the
CISG, it is not only the offeror 6 6 but the "parties"'67 who may exclude
default rules. This comparison demonstrates that the common law empha-
sizes the legal character of each contracting party, while Japanese contract
law and the CISG do not recognize the sharp distinction between offeror
and offeree.
B. A Major Function of the Common Law in the Contract Formation
Process
In the American legal system, the contract formation process has some
characteristic rules and principles, some of which are deemed to be "funda-
mental tenets" of the common law.6 8 Such rules include the principles of
revocability, 6 9 the mailbox rule, 70 and the counteroffer theory.7 1 Although
they have been explained independently, they all represent attempts to bal-
ance the power between the parties by protecting the offeree from the
offeror, or vice versa.
1. Common Law Rules and Principles That Reflect the Balancing Function
It is advantageous to consider events chronologically,7 2 beginning
with the appearance of an offer. In American law schools, students learn
what constitutes an offer by distinguishing offers from statements that are
not offers, such as invitations to make an offer.73 In cases of doubt as to
whether a proposal is an offer, courts are disinclined to characterize a pro-
posal as an offer and to thereby hold its maker to the contract.7 4 This
reluctance to characterize proposals as offers is one of the ways in which
courts seek to balance the parties' interests. Courts have reason for cau-
65. The Restatement contains numerous provisions allowing the offeror to exclude
default rules provided for in the Restatement. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT § 28 ("unless a
contrary intention is manifested"); id. § 30 ("unless otherwise indicated by the lan-
guage"); id. § 38 ("unless the offeror has manifested a contrary intention"); id. § 54
("unless the offer requests"; id. § 56 "except ... where the offer manifests a contrary
intention"); id. § 63 ("unless the offer provides otherwise").
66. See CISG, supra note 29, art. 6, which prescribes that "the parties may exclude
the application of this Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the
effect of any of its provisions." As to the rule under the Japanese legal system, see MINPO
arts. 90-91; SAKAE WAGATSUMA, SHINTEI MINPO SosoKU 253-55 (1965).
67. See CISG, supra note 29, art. 6; WAGATSUMA, supra note 66, at 253-55; MINPO,
arts. 90-91.
68. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 19, § 3.17, at 283 (stating that "[iut is a funda-
mental tenet of the common law that an offer is generally freely revocable and can be
countermanded by the offeror at any time before it has been accepted by the offeree").
69. See id. at 283-87.
70. See CAt.AMARI & PERILLO, supra note 7, § 2.23, at 116-17.
71. See id. § 2-20, at 98-100.
72. See CORBIN, supra note 24, § 2.1, at 99.
73. See, e.g., SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 24, at 403-17. The casebook discusses
Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, 86 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Minn. 1957) in the
subsection entitled "The Offer," and concludes that "whether in any individual instance
a newspaper advertisement is an offer rather than an invitation to make an offer
depends on the legal intention of the parties and the surrounding circumstances."
74. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 19, § 3.10, at 237.
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tion when the offeror gives the casting vote by manifesting his intention to
make an offer because binding the proposing party to a contract exposes
that party to liability based on the recipient's expectation interest even
without any reliance. 75 Courts can only make case law when presented
with a dispute between parties. 76 When this happens, the parties generally
dispute the existence of the contract. With respect to closing the deal, the
offeree has the casting vote. 77 Therefore, the only way a court can balance
two parties' interests at the time of litigation is by hesitating to characterize
a proposal as an offer. In this way, the court balances the parties' interests
by protecting the offeror from the power of the casting voter, or offeree.
Once an offer becomes effective, it is a "fundamental tenet" of the com-
mon law that the offeror may revoke the offer at any time prior to its
acceptance. 78 Courts allow offerors to revoke offers for reasons similar to
the contractual requirement of mutuality of obligation. If the offeror could
not freely revoke the offer, he would be bound by the offer even though the
offeree would not be bound. This would "subject the offeror to the risk
that the offeree might speculate in a fluctuating market. '7 9 When one con-
siders that courts have opposed efforts "by one party to speculate at the
expense of another,"80 the principle of free revocability illustrates the
courts' concern about possible imbalances between the parties. 8 1 This
imbalance arises because after the offeror extends an offer, the offeree has
an advantage over the offeror.8 2 But this principle of revocability places the
offeree in an unstable position.
The offeree "may need time to decide whether to accept the offer and,
during that time, may need to spend money and effort in deciding."8 3 The
doctrine of consideration, combined with the principle of revocability,
would make it impossible to give proper protection to the offeree in the
absence of some additional mechanism.8 4 The option contract, which lim-
75. See id. Similar functions can be seen in the "consideration doctrine," which
serves a "cautionary function." See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L.
REV. 799, 800 (1941). For liability of an offeror based on his offer, see P.S. ATIYAH,
ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 143 (1990).
76. Robert A. Hillman, The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory, 67 TEX. L. REV. 103,
135 n.218 (1988).
77. See Kagayama, supra note 12, at 546-49.
78. See CORBIN, supra note 24, § 2.18, at 217 (stating that even in the case an offer
containing a promise that the offer will not be revoked for a prescribed period and
where both parties believe that the offer is thereby irrevocable, "there may still remain a
power to revoke"); FARN.SWORT, supra note 19, § 3.17, at 283; SAMUEL WILLISTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 5.8, at 668 (4th ed. 1990) (stating that "even if the
offer expressly states that it shall not be withdrawn; revocation is still possible"); see also
CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 7, § 2.23, at 106 (stating that "[a] revocable offer to a
bilateral contract may be revoked at any time prior to its acceptance").
79. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 19, § 3.17, at 284.
80. See HONNOLD, supra note 5, at 197 n.2.
81. See Corbin, supra note 47, at 199.
82. See RESTATEMENT §§ 29 cmt. a, 52 cmt. a, 58 cmt. a; see also supra note 58 and
accompanying text.
83. FARNSWORTH, supra note 19, § 3.23, at 321.
84. See id.
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its revocability, developed in the United States to protect the offeree.8 5 Tra-
ditionally under the common law, courts found it difficult to protect the
offeree from the offeror's power of revocation.8 6 Under the traditional
view, in the absence of consideration, any promise by the offeror to limit
his power of revocation was simply a nudum pactum, or naked contract.8 7
In other words, a "representation that an offer will remain open is a bare
promise, unsupported by consideration, and therefore, unenforceable." 88
The option contract allows the offeree to provide consideration in
exchange for a limitation on the offeror's power to revoke. 89
An offeror can revoke the offer at any time prior to its acceptance with-
out making an option contract.90 In such cases, the parties will confront
the issue of when an acceptance becomes effective. Many arguments have
been made with respect to the effective moment of acceptance. The
"mailbox rule," which makes acceptance effective when dispatched, is
almost universally accepted in common law jurisdictions.9 1 Section 63(a)
of the Restatement and major contract treatises endorse the mailbox rule.9 2
The mailbox rule differs from the "receipt rules" found in many civil law
jurisdictions, which make acceptance effective when received by the
offeror. 93 The receipt rules are useful because if acceptance becomes effec-
tive when the offeror receives the acceptance, the offeror has notice that the
obligation binds him.94 Indeed, most notices sent by mail are not opera-
tive until received. 95 Thus, there must be some reason why common law
jurisdictions have adopted the mailbox rule when a reasonable alternative
rule exists. Perhaps the rationale for the mailbox rule is that it protects the
offeree by placing the risk of loss and inconvenience on the offeror and
shortening the period of free revocability.9 6 Unlike the general mailbox
rule, an acceptance under an option contract is not effective until received
by the offeror. 97 This difference seems to support the conclusion that the
85. See, e.g., Marsh v. Lott, 97 P. 163 (Cal. Ct. App. 1908).
86. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 19, § 3.23, at 321.
87. See SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 24, at 442.
88. See id; see also WILLISTON, supra note 78, § 5.8, at 666 (stating that "[a]s a result
of the rule that unsealed promises without consideration are not binding, offers, unless
under seal in a jurisdiction recognizing the seal or given for a consideration, may be
revoked by the offeror at any time prior to the creation of a contract by acceptance").
89. See RESTATEMENT § 63(b).
90. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
91. See Soldau v. Organon, Inc., 860 F.2d 355, 356 (9th Cir. 1988).
92. See id.
93. See RESTATEMENT § 63(a).
94. See Mactier's Adm'rs v. Frith, 6 Wend. 103 (N.Y. 1830), quoted in CORBIN, supra
note 24, § 3.24, at 440-41 n.8.
95. See CORBIN, supra note 24, § 3.24, at 443 (noting that "an offeror can always so
word the offer and so limit the power of acceptance as to make the receipt of the accept-
ance necessary to the creation of a contract" such that when an offer provides that notice
of acceptance must be received within thirty days, courts may interpret the offer as
requiring receipt by the offeror of the acceptance within thirty days").
96. See id. at 440-441; HIGUCHI, supra note 24, at 125-26; Friedrich Kessler & Edith
Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Com-
parative Study, 77 IALv. L. REV. 401, 417 (1964).
97. RESTATEMENT § 63(b).
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"mailbox rule" aims to protect the offeree because the revocability of option
contracts is already limited, thereby obviating the need to balance the par-
ties' interests. 9 8
Another way the common law seeks to balance the powers of the
offeror and offeree is through rules governing the medium of acceptance.
Under § 30 of the Restatement, an offer invites acceptance by any reasona-
ble medium unless otherwise indicated. 99 The concept of reasonability is
flexible. 10 0 The Restatement states that even an offeree's unreasonable
method of acceptance is effective when sent if "it is seasonably dispatched
and provided that it is received within the time a seasonably dispatched
acceptance sent in a reasonable manner would normally have arrived."' 01
These rules balance the parties' interests in the same way that the mailbox
rule does. The offeror is entitled to negate these rules, including the
mailbox rule, by prescribing otherwise in the offer.' 0 2 However, courts are
disinclined to construe language as calling for a particular medium of
acceptance. 10 3 This tendency of courts limits the power of the offeror
more directly.
2. Balancing Function from a Comparative Perspective
When one compares the contract formation process in America to that
of Japan, it is clear that balancing the parties' interests is a major purpose
of the common law that governs the process. Some unique institutions in
the Japanese contract formation process 10 4 include Tetsuke (earnest),
Moshikomi no Yuin (invitations to make offers), and Yoyaku (pre-contractual
reservations). A comparative study shows that the American legal system
has developed its characteristic balancing principles, while the Japanese
legal system has developed institutions that control the acquisition of the
casting vote. Only by balancing the contracting parties' interests can the
law prevent one party from obtaining an advantaged position. If such bal-
ancing is to occur, legal institutions must be developed to control the con-
tract formation process.
As we have seen, it is advantageous to consider events chronologically,
beginning with the appearance of an offer. In Japan, an offer is also distin-
guished from invitations to make offers.' 0 5 But interestingly, from the
98. In one famous treatise, Farnsworth explains that an option contract is one form
of protecting the offeree. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 19, § 3.23, at 286.
99. See RESTATEMENT § 30.
100. See CA.AMARI & PERILLO, supra note 7, § 2.23, at 108.
101. See id. at 109. The traditional rule provided that "if the offeree uses an unreason-
able medium of acceptance . . . the acceptance is effective when received rather than
sent." See id.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 107.
104. See Kagayama, supra note 12, at 545. Unless otherwise indicated, the following
analyses of the institutions of Tetsuke, Moshikomino Yuin, and Yoyaku are mainly based
on this work of Professor Kagayama.
105. See SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 24, at 403-17.
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viewpoint of American legal system, the following situation is pointed out
as a part of the Japanese explanation of the invitation to make offers:
One of the major concerns of the parties in the contract formation process
will be which party will acquire the casting vote. In the case of contract
formation between individuals, the parties seem not so interested in which
party will offer and which party will accept. However, an enterprise recog-
nizes this point precisely in the contract formation between enterprise and a
consumer. For example, a consumer is never given a "form of acceptance"
but is always given a "form of offer." In this way, the enterprise tries to avoid
being an offeror by intent. 10 6
An enterprise has no problem if the consumer makes an offer, because
the enterprise can choose whether to accept it. However, the enterprise
cannot gain a profit if it waits for a customer to make an offer. On the
other hand, if the enterprise carelessly makes an offer, it risks being bound
to transact with a consumer who has no credit. Therefore, the enterprise
makes an invitation to make offers but does not address it to specific per-
sons. This enables the enterprise to choose good customers from a large
pool of offers. The invitation to make offers is a strategy for increasing
profits by acquiring the casting vote.
The institution of Yoyaku translates as "reservations" and is provided
for in the basic Civil Code ofJapan. Article 556 of the Japanese Civil Code
prescribes that one party's promise to buy or sell becomes effective when
the other party manifests his intention to complete the sale. 10 7 According
to traditionally accepted contract theory in Japan, this institution does not
create a "pure" reservation but rather a (formed) contract for a sale that
becomes effective on condition that the other party manifest an intent to
complete the contract. 108 However, the reservation itself does not form a
contract. Indeed, the former Supreme Courts of Japan rejected this view
and stated that the unilateral reservation of sale is a "pure" reservation,
meaning that a contract for sale is formed only by the other party's mani-
festation of intent to complete it. 10 9 The institution of reservation is best
understood as a mechanism to reverse the position of offeror and offeree.
Thus, a person in the position of offeror becomes the offeree if he makes a
reservation. If a person, without access to advertising media and unable to
invite individuals to make offers, wishes to initiate a deal and to grasp the
same casting vote as the offeree, that person can make a reservation.
An invitation to make an offer and a reservation both serve the func-
tion of acquiring the casting vote: in both cases the maker obtains the
power to complete the contract if the other party makes an offer. For exam-
ple, where person A invites offers and obtains an offer from B, A both initi-
ates the contract formation process and acquires the casting vote in closing
the deal. Similarly, if A offers a reservation and B accepts it, A also initiates
the contract formation process and acquires the casting vote in closing the
106. Kagayama, supra note 12, at 550.
107. MINPo art. 556.
108. See Kagayama, supra note 12, at 551.
109. See Sugawara v. Sugawara, 25 MINSHOROKU 1007 (1919).
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The institution of earnest has its roots in an old trade custom called
"Tetsuke Sonbai Modoshi," which was developed prior to the introduction of
the Western legal system in Japan."' Where a buyer advances an earnest
on a sale, the buyer can rescind the contract by abandoning the earnest
that he paid in advance. 1 2 The seller can rescind the contract by
refunding twice the amount he received as earnest.113 This institution is
similar to an "option contract" because if the market price of goods falls
after the buyer advanced on it, the buyer loses only the advanced payment.
To understand the institution of earnest, it is useful to review the option
contract, which has a unique place in American contract law.
As the preceding subsection shows, "an offeree may need time to
decide whether to accept the offer and, during that time, may need to
spend money and effort in deciding. ' 114 The doctrine of consideration,
combined with the principle of revocability, makes it nearly impossible to
properly protect the offeree in the absence of some additional mecha-
nism.115 Traditionally under the common law, a "representation that an
offer will remain open is a bare promise unsupported by consideration,
and, therefore, unenforceable." 116 The option contract allows the offeree
to provide consideration in exchange for a limitation on the offeror's power
to revoke. 117 Because consideration is not required for a contract to be
legally enforceable in the Japanese legal system,118 the development of an
institution similar to the option contract seems unnecessary. Nonetheless,
a similar institution does exist in Japan and is known as "earnest." The
institution of earnest differs from the general option contract because
under option contracts, only the party who paid for the option is entitled
to rescind, whereas under the Japanese institution of earnest, the party
who received the earnest in advance is also entitled to rescind by refunding
twice the amount of what he received. In a sense, the institution of earnest
is a "bilateral" option."19
The person making the invitation or the reservation and the payer of
earnest-money obtains the casting vote to complete the contract. While
these institutions have been considered separate or distinct from the com-
mon law understanding of offer and acceptance, they all are strategies for
110. See Kagayama, supra note 12, at 565.
111. See id. at 544, citing KENJIRO UME, MINPO YOGI 481 (1887); YUTAKA YOSHIDA, TET-
SUtE 160 (1985); Minatsu Yokoyama, MINPo art. 775 (Tetsuke), in MINPOTEN NO
HYAKUNEN 309 (Toshio Hironaka & Eiichi Hoshino eds., 1998).
112. See MINPO art. 557.
113. See id.
114. FARNSWORTH, supra note 19, § 3.23, at 321.
115. See id.
116. Id; see WILLISTON, supra note 78, § 5.8, at 666.
117. See RESTATEMENT § 63(b).
118. See, e.g., TAKASHI UCHIDA, KEIYAKU NO SAISEI 30-31 (1990); HIGUCHI, supra note
24, at 90-96; see also MINPo, art. 549 (prescribing that "[a] contract of gift becomes
effective when one of the parties manifested his intent gratuitously to transfer property
of his own to the other party and the other party agrees to accept it").
119. Kagayama, supra note 12, at 544.
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acquiring the casting vote. If the law balances the interests of the con-
tracting parties, they will be less able to obtain an advantaged position.
However, if it does not, the parties will be able to obtain an advantaged
position. In such a legal system, it may be necessary for the law to provide
institutions that control the "strategies of acquiring the 'casting vote."
120
III. Analysis of the Problem of Delay in the Transmission of
Acceptance
A. American Approach
The foregoing analysis shows that contract formation is the creation of
a power that binds both parties. The common law uses a balancing
approach to regulate this process. With this background, Part III analyzes
the particular situation of a delay in the transmission of acceptance.
1. Common Law Approach
In common law systems, there has been "no occasion" to deal with the
problem of delayed acceptances. 12 1 Under the common law, when cases
are presented for which there is no judicial precedent, they must be gov-
erned by the "general principle, applicable to cases most nearly analogous,
but modified and adapted to new circumstances, by considerations of fit-
ness and propriety, of reason and justice, which grow out of those circum-
stances." 122 Thus, to solve the problem of delay in the transmission of
acceptance, one must begin by finding the "most analogous"
circumstances.
The problem of a delayed transmission of an acceptance is analogous
to a "late acceptance," which is governed by the "counteroffer theory," to
the extent that the acceptance has not reached the offeror in the time of
receipt was due. Under the common law view, a late acceptance is merely
a counteroffer, which creates a contract only if the original offeror accepts
the counteroffer. 1 23 Thus, under the counteroffer theory, a late acceptance
120. See id. at 546, 564 (stating that these institutions can be considered as the "strat-
egies of acquiring the 'casting vote"').
121. See HONNOLD, supra note 5, at 198. Several articles assert that there is a rule that
governs this problem. However, these articles offer incoherent explanations. See
CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 7, § 2.20(b); Franco Ferrari, A Comparative Overview in
Offer and Acceptance Inter Absentes, 10 B.U. INT'L LJ. 171; Franco Ferrari, Formation of
Contract in South American Legal System, 16 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. LJ. 629; Kessler &
Fine, supra note 96. Some of them provide a rule, citing cases similar to those provided
and cited later in this Article. However, without a precise analysis, such as that provided
later in this Article, the cited case might not apply to our paradigm case, since the case
provides a rule "where no time was specified and the time limit is merely that indefinite
period called 'reasonable time."' See CORBIN, supra note 24, § 3.20. One must analyze
these cases carefully, because a "case that might be thought analogous may here be
distinguished," particularly in this situation. See id.
122. See Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Maine R.R., 67 Mass. 263, 267-268 (1854).
123. See, e.g., Ismert & Assoc., Inc. v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 801 F.2d 536,
541 (1st Cir. 1986), citing Kurio v. United States, 429 F. Supp. 42, 64 (S.D. Tex. 1970);
Childs v. Adams, 909 S.W.2d 641 (Ark. 1996); Sabo v. Fasano, 201 Cal. Rptr. 270, 272
(Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Achour v. Belk & Co., 251 S.E.2d 157 (Ga. 1978); In re Marriage of
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is a counteroffer that may bind the offeree if the original offeror accepts the
counteroffer. The essence of the counteroffer theory of the late acceptance
is that "unless the offeree exercises his power of acceptance before [the offer]
expires, there is no power to accept.' 1 24 In the case of a delay in the trans-
mission of an acceptance, the offeree has sent his notice of acceptance
such that, if its transmission were normal, it would reach the offeror by the
due date. The buyer in the paradigm case properly "exercises his power of
acceptance" before "the end of the time limit of the offer," because the
offeree "has completed every act essential to" exercise his power of accept-
ance. 1 25 If this is so, it becomes doubtful whether the counteroffer theory,
which applies to late acceptances, should apply to the problem of delay in
the transmission of acceptances.
The counteroffer theory, which governs late acceptances, also contrib-
utes to the balancing of the parties' interests. Under the counteroffer the-
ory, an acceptance with a material change from the terms set forth in the
offer is not an acceptance of the original offer but rather a new offer. 12 6 In
the case of late acceptances, the offeree wants to change the manner of
acceptance prescribed by the offer. 1 2 7 According to this theory, if an
offeree wants to assume the role of the "master of the offer" and change the
contents of the offer, he must give up the power of the "casting voter" for
the sake of balancing the interests of the parties. 1 28 The counteroffer the-
ory, however, focuses on the difference between the "master of the offer"
and the "casting voter," which does not create the imbalance existing in the
problem of delay in the transmission of acceptance.
The following hypothetical demonstrates the imbalance that arises
when the unforeseen delay occurs after the offeree sent his acceptance to
the offeror. Suppose prices increase sharply on October 1st in the para-
digm case. If there is no rule applicable to the problem of delay in the
transmission of acceptance, the late acceptance constitutes a counteroffer,
Masterson, 453 N.W.2d 650 (Iowa 1990), citing Morrison v. Rayen Inv., Inc., 624 P.2d
11, 12 (Nev. 1981). The following cases "treat the late acceptance as a counteroffer
which must be accepted by the original offeror to create a contract." See Kurio, 429 F.
Supp. at 65; Morrison v. Rayen Inv., Inc., 624 P.2d 11, 12 (Nev. 1981); 22 W. Main St.,
Inc. v. Bouiszewski, 34 A.D.2d 358, 361 (N.Y. 1970); Bridge v. O'Callahan, 118 N.Y.S.2d
837, 838 (N.Y. City Ct. 1953); Frandsen v. Gerstner, 487 P.2d 697, 700 (Utah 1971);
Wax v. N.W. Seed Co., 64 P.2d 513, 515 (Wash. 1937); RESTATEMENT § 70.
124. See Sabo, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 272, citing Kurio, 429 F. Supp. at 64, 65; Morrison, 97
Nev. 58 at 12; Bouiszewski, 34 A.D.2d at 360-61; Frandsen, 487 P.2d at 700; Wax, 64
P.2d at 515.
125. See RESTATEMENT § 66 cmt. a.
126. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); see also RESTATEMENT
§ 39. When strictly applied, this is known as the "mirror image" rule. Although its
application is not as strong today, its principle is still sustained.
127. Cf. supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
128. When we consider that "the bargaining process (especially when it is done
between the parties at arm's length) has become more limited in modern society," the
power to change the substance of the offer is likely to change the substance of the result-
ing contract. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 7, § 1.3, at 5. But see Ian R. Macneil,
Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and
Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854.
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and the original offeror can speculate on a fluctuating market to the detri-
ment of the original offeree. Courts have strongly resisted attempts by one
party to speculate at the expense of another. 129 The offeror is in
advantaged position, not because he is the "master of the offer" but
because he can obtain the reason to know of the delay. An analogous prob-
lem arises when transmission of an offer is delayed.
Generally, there is no "time limit" for tendering offers. Thus, the delay
in the transmission of an offer is typically not a problem. However, a delay
in the transmission of an offer is a problem in the following situations: In
the first scenario, A writes B, "I am eager to sell my house. I would take
$20,000 for it. If you want to buy my house, I need to hear from you by
May 1st." B promptly answers, "I will buy your house for $20,000
cash." 130 In doubtful cases, courts are reluctant to characterize a proposal
as an offer.13 ' Thus, A's proposal is likely to be considered an invitation to
make offers.13 2 Therefore, it is not A's letter but B's letter that constitutes
an offer. If so, A must receive B's letter by May 1st. Therefore, there is a
time limit on the offer's effectiveness. In the second scenario, A writes B, "I
promise to deliver you my house if you promise to pay me $20,000. If you
want to buy my house, I must receive your letter of acceptance by May 1st."
Suppose A's letter is categorized as an offer. In the latter scenario, can B
accept A's offer if B receives A's letter after May 1st? Common law rules
exist to govern the latter type of delay in the transmission of the offer.'
33
The effect of delay in the transmission of an offer, as in the first hypo-
thetical scenario, and the effect of mistake in the transmission of an offer,
as in the second hypothetical scenario, are determined by "analogous prin-
ciples.' 34 These problems are determined by similar principles because
the circumstances are analogous. First, both problems involve the ques-
tion of contract formation. Second, in the cases of both mistake and delay
in transmission of the offer, unforeseen circumstances occur after the
offeror has sent his offer. Third, if the offeree exploits the defect, the
offeror is adversely affected. 135 In the case of a mistake in the transmis-
sion of an offer, "the majority view is that the message as transmitted is
operative unless the other party knows or has reason to know of the mis-
take."'13 6 This is also true when there is a delay in the transmission of an
offer. In other words, if "the offeree knew or should have known that the
offer was delayed, he may not take advantage of the delay."'13 7 Cases con-
cerning a mistake or a delay in the transmission of an offer are both gov-
129. See HONNOLD, supra note 5, at 197 n.2.
130. See RESTATEMENT § 26, illus. 4.
131. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 19, § 3.10, at 237.
132. See id.
133. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT § 49; CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 7, § 2.20(a), at 88;
CORBIN, supra note 24, § 2.17, at 213.
134. See RESTATEMENT, ch. 6 intro.
135. See id.
136. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 7, § 2.24 at 112.
137. See WILLISTON, supra note 78, § 5.21 at 749.
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erned by the same case-Germain Fruit Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co.138
In Germain, the offeror dispatched an offer by telegraph, quoting
oranges at "two [dollars and] sixty [cents]."'139 As delivered to the offeree,
the dispatch was altered by the omission of the word "two."1 40 As received,
offeree reasonably understood the offer as oranges at $1.60 per box,
though the market price was $2.60 per box. 14 1 The offeree ordered a cer-
tain amount of the oranges, the offeror shipped the oranges, and the offeree
received them but refused to pay more than $1.60 per box for them. 14 2
Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court of California rejected the
offeree's contention that "[tihe recipient of the message has the absolute
right to rely upon the message as correct and to act upon it."'1 4 3 The rule is
that "if it is apparent from the face of message, or otherwise, that an error
has been made, no contract results [because] [t]he addressee is not justi-
fied in relying upon its contents."'144 The court found that the offeree had
reason to suspect that a mistake had been made and that the offeree acted
in bad faith. 145
It is troublesome to conclude that the legal consequence of Germain is
"merely that the contract is voidable by the party adversely affected,"' 14 6 or,
that "there is no power of acceptance at all."'1 4 7 Suppose that the offeree
inquired about the price after discovering the mistake, and that the offeror
quoted the price as $1.60 per box, because the offeror wanted to keep busi-
ness with the offeree for a long period, or because the market price sharply
declined after he made the offer. Courts do not usually consider the ade-
quacy of consideration in determining the validity of a contract. 148 It is
also troublesome to conclude that when applying this principle to the first
delay in the transmission of the offer, the defect renders the contract voida-
ble. If A (the individual inviting others to make an offer) does not have the
power to accept as a result of A's knowledge of the delay, B (the offeror) is
adversely affected.
In Germain, the court found "not only that there was reason to suspect
that a mistake had been made, but [that the offeree] actually knew that the
message had not been correctly sent and acted upon it in bad faith."'1 4 9
Under such circumstances, the offeree had a duty to inquire as to whether
138. See Germain Fruit Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 70 P. 658, 659 (Cal. 1902).
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 659 (emphasis added).
144. See CA~aLAi & PERILLO, supra note 7, § 2.24, at 112 n.7.
145. See Germain Fruit Co., 70 P. at 659.
146. See RESTATEMENT, ch. 6 intro.
147. See CORBIN, supra note 24, § 2.17, at 213 (noting that most courts would hold
that there is no power of acceptance where the offeree knows or has reason to know that
the offer was delayed).
148. See CAtAmARI & PERILLO, supra note 7, § 4.4, at 172-73 (stating that courts "have
believed that it would be an unwarranted interference with the freedom of contract if
they were to relieve an adult party from a bad exchange").
149. See Germain Fruit Co., 70 P. at 659 (emphasis added).
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the telegram was correct.' 5 0 The party that has reason to suspect that a
mistake has been made has a duty based on the principle of good faith to
inquire as to the correctness of the offer. 15 1 If he does not perform this
duty, the contract is voidable by the party adversely affected (in this case,
the offeror). 5 2 This principle is also applicable to delays in the transmis-
sion of offers. If a party has reason to know of the delay, the delayed offer
is effective unless that party informs the second party in a timely manner
of his intention to retract on account of delay.
This principle governing a mistake or delay in the transmission of an
offer also applies to a delay in the transmission of acceptance. Indeed, in
Phillips v. Moor, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that
if the party to whom it is made, makes known his acceptance of it to the
party making it within any period which he could fairly have supposed to be
reasonable, good faith requires the [offeror], if he intends to retract on
account of delay, to make known that intention promptly.
153
The Court stated that if the offeror does not propmptly inform the offeree
of his intent to retract, he waives any objection to the late acceptance.14
Thus, when the offeror has reason to know of a delay in the transmission of
the acceptance, the offeror has a duty to promptly inform the offeree that
he intends to revoke or else the acceptance will bind the offeror.
1 55
150. See id.
151. See id. Good faith can also be the basis of an affirmative duty prior to the forma-
tion of the contract. See Summers, supra note 18, at 204 n.43.
152. See RESTATEMENT § 153 cmt. e. But cf. id. § 154 cmt. c (noting that if the mis-
taken party willfully chooses to remain ignorant of relevant facts, that party may be held
to bear the risk of the mistake).
153. Phillips v. Moor, 71 Me. 78, 80 (1880).
154. See id.
155. See id. Although the result of the interpretation of Phillips is similar to this Arti-
cle, the theory is different. Cf. CAtuI & PERILLO, supra note 7, § 2.20 at 89 (discuss-
ing the view held by some that if the "acceptance is late but sent in what could plausibly
be argued to be a reasonable time the original offeror has a duty to reply within a reason-
able time); CORBIN, supra note 24, § 3.20 at 411 (stating that the contract is formed in
Phillips "not because silence in such case is an acceptance of a counteroffer, but because
the offeror has reason to know that the offeree thinks there is a contract .. ."). This
Article's proposal does not solve the problem of speculation, sanctioning of which
courts have strongly resisted. Suppose that in the paradigm case, the market changed
sharply during the last week of September. Because the offeror decides whether to form
a contract, he can decide in light of the market changes. See HONNOLD, supra note 5, at
197 n.2. His situation is similar under the counteroffer theory (i.e., late dispatch),
except that here he must take affirmative action if he chooses not to be bound by a
contract. Also, here, it was not the offeree's delay that made him vulnerable to specula-
tion. The offeree would suppose, at the time of the change in market, that his accept-
ance had already arrived. Speculation is particularly problematic where the offeree has
made his declaration late and has done so by performing his obligation under the con-
tract in advance. PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 155 (Geoffrey Thomas trans., 2d ed. 1998). The
injustice of allowing the offeror to choose whether he will be bound in this situation
becomes apparent as the period of the delay lengthens. E.A. Farnsworth, Comment on
Art. 18, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CON-
VENTION 194 (Cesare M. Bianca & Michael J. Bonell eds., 1987). Suppose that the delay
is several months. Could the offeror still hold the contract? We should remember that
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Note that the party protected by the law in the case of a delayed trans-
mission of an acceptance is the offeree, who is in a similar position to that
of the offeror in the case of a delayed transmission of an offer. The differ-
ence between the offeror and the offeree does not destroy the analogy
between the problem of delay in the transmission of offer and acceptance.
There is an imbalance between the parties in the case of an unforeseen
delay during transmission that is based on neither the power of the offeror,
nor the power of the offeree. The imbalance is based on the fact that the
receiver of the offer or acceptance has reason to know of the delay because
of indications such as the letter's date or postmark.156 Consequently,
whether the offeror or the offeree receives the delayed manifestation of
intent (that is, an offer or an acceptance) does not destroy the analogy to a
delayed transmission, and so a similar rationale may apply.
One can obtain the same result under the counteroffer theory, which
applies to late acceptances, but there is a theoretical difference, which cre-
ates a practical difference. The "duty to speak" is also present in the con-
text of the counteroffer theory. 15 7 Under the counteroffer theory, a late
acceptance is not an acceptance but a new offer. 15 8 However, in some
exceptional situations, a late acceptance may create a duty to speak by the
offeror if he wishes to reject the acceptance on account of delay; thus the
offeror's silence operates as acceptance to the counteroffer. 159 This Article
proposes that a duty to speak does not arise under the counteroffer theory,
which governs late acceptances. This theoretical difference brings about
different conditions for the imposition of the "duty to speak." Under the
counteroffer theory, there are two exceptional situations where the offeree's
silence constitutes acceptance: "those where the offeree silently takes the
offered benefit and those where one party relies on the other party's mani-
festation of intent that silently operated as acceptance."' 160 However, this
Article suggests that in the case of a delay in the transmission of accept-
ance, the offeror has a duty to speak regardless of these facts, if the offeror
has reason to know that the acceptance was timely sent but received late
due to a delay. It is not the original offeror's duty as the new offeree of a
new offer, but a duty of the original offeror as an addressee who is in a
this is the situation governed by the "analogous principles" applicable to Germain and
Phillips, under which a party has the duty to protect the other party, based on the princi-
ple of good faith. According to this theory, the problem of speculation can be easily
avoided by simply holding that the offeror would not be acting in good faith if he treated
the delayed acceptance as acceptance in such circumstances. Cf. HONNOLD, supra note
5; Farnsworth, supra; SCHLECHTRIEM, supra.
156. See CORBIN, supra note 24, § 2.17, at 213, § 3.20, at 410.
157. The words "duty to speak" can be found in Restatement, section 70, comment a,
which states that "the original offeror may have a duty to speak, for example, if the
purported acceptance embodies a plausible but erroneous reading of the original offer."
RESTATEMENT § 70 cmt. a; see also CALAmARI & PERILLO, supra note 7, at 89-90.
158. See CORBIN, supra note 24, at 410-11.
159. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT § 70 (explaining the meaning of "duty to speak" under the
counteroffer theory of late acceptance). "A late or otherwise defective acceptance may
be effective as an offer to the original offeror, but his silence operates as an acceptance
in such a case only as stated in § 69." Id.
160. RESTATEMENT § 69 cmt a.
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position to have reason to know of the delay. 16 1 Thus, just as an offeree
who knows of a delay in the transmission of an offer cannot exploit the
delay, an offeror who knows that an acceptance was delayed in transmis-
sion has a duty to inform the offeree if he wishes to reject the
acceptance. 162
Under the common law, if the offeror has reason to know that the
acceptance has been sent on time, but it arrives late due to an unforeseen
delay, the delayed acceptance is effective unless the offeror promptly
informs the offeree of his intention to retract due to the delay. 163 The legal
character of the offeror as master of the offer is an essential element of the
common law's balancing approach so that the offeror may place the risk of
the delay on the offeree, just as the offeror negates other rules or principles
balancing the parties.' 64 However, such a requirement must be clearly
prescribed. 165
2. CISG Approach
The common law rule applies to the problem of a delayed transmission
of an acceptance if both parties conduct business in the United States,
while the CISG applies if the contracting parties have places of business in
two different countries. 166 Under the CISG, an acceptance is generally not
effective until it reaches the offeror. This approach differs from the com-
161. See CORBIN, supra note 24, § 3.20, at 411; cf. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 7,
§ 2.20, at 89.
162. A similar result can be reached under traditional offer-acceptance analysis with-
out using the counteroffer theory. Under the traditional offer-acceptance analysis, the
mailbox rule protects the offeree by placing "the risk of loss and inconvenience on the
offeror." See CORBIN, supra note 24, § 3.24, at 440-41. Thus, there is less need for a
particular rule governing a delay in the transmission of acceptance because the law
already protects the offeree. See Kessler & Fine, supra note 96, at 417. In civil law
countries, where an acceptance becomes effective when it is received, rules concerning a
delay in the transmission of acceptance protect the offeree, because receipt rules place
the risk of loss and inconvenience on the offeree. See id. at 417-19. The imbalance of
the parties in the case of a delay in the transmission of acceptance is based on the status
of the addressor and the addressee rather than on the status of the offeror and the
offeree. Thus, one can analogize a delay in the transmission of acceptance to the delay
in the transmission of an offer. By doing so, the common law methodology's solution to
the problem of delay in the transmission of acceptance is persuasive. Otherwise, the
rule in Phillips may be applicable only "where no time was specified." See Phillips v.
Moor, 71 Me. 78, 80 (1880); CORBIN, supra note 24, § 3.20, at 411.
163. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 7, § 2.20, at 89.
164. See id. § 2.23, at 107-10. "The offeror, it must be remembered, is master of his
offer and has power to negate the mailbox rule." See id. at 109. Therefore, "[wihen the
offeror prescribes the exclusive place, time, or medium of acceptance the offer controls.
No contract is formed unless the terms of the offer are followed." See id. at 107. The
offeror can negate many of the rules prescribed in the Restatement. See, e.g., RESTATE-
MENT, §§ 24, 28, 30, 38, 54, 56, 56, 63. It is significant to find such rules in the real
world in which most parties bring contractual claims without drafting their agreements
precisely, for necessary purposes other than legal norms. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-
Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55, 64 (1963).
165. See CALAiU & PERILLO, supra note 7, § 2.23, at 107-10; supra note 164.
166. See CISG, supra note 29.
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mon law mailbox rule. 16 7 Therefore, the CISG must have a rule governing
the problem of delay in the transmission of acceptance. 168 This rule is
embodied in Article 21(2) of the CISG, which states that
[i]f a letter or other writing containing a late acceptance shows that it has
been sent in such circumstances that if its transmission had been normal it
would have reached the offeror in due time, the late acceptance is effective as
an acceptance unless, without delay, the offeror orally informs the offeree
that he considers his offer as having lapsed or dispatches a notice to that
effect. 1 6 9
Because the American legal system is unique in the extent to which its
judges are authorized to "override" legislation, 170 we must examine
whether or not the provision is legally effective in the American legal
system.
The CISG distinguishes between an acceptance sent late and one sent
on time that arrives late because of an unforeseen delay in the transmis-
sion. 17 1 Article 21(2) of the CISG deals with the latter situation, where the
offeree is diligent in sending an acceptance and the offeror knows or rea-
sonably should know that the delay occurred through the fault of the inter-
mediary. 17 2 When the offeror knows or should know that the acceptance
is late due to a delay in the transmission, the CISG, like the common law,
creates an exception to the general rule.17 3 Under this exception, the
acceptance is treated as effective in order to protect the offeree. 174 How-
ever, because the offeror may have changed his position after the accept-
ance failed to reach him in a timely fashion, 175 the CISG protects the
offeror by allowing him to inform the offeree orally or in writing that he
considers his offer to have lapsed. 176 This yields exactly the same result as
a "duty to speak" under the common law. 17 7 The CISG thus attempts to
167. "An acceptance of an offer becomes effective at the moment the indication of
assent reaches the offeror. An acceptance is not effective if the indication of assent does
not reach the offeror within the time he has fixed or, if no time is fixed, within a reasona-
ble time." Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See ATIYA- & SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 43.
171. See SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 155, at 150.
172. John E. Murray, Jr., An Essay on the Formation of Contracts and Related Matters
Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
8 J.L. & CoM. 11, 35-38 (1988).
173. See id.
174. See id. at 37.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See supra Part III.A. The same problem of speculation that occurs under the
common law can also occur under the CISG art. 21(2), supra note 29. Suppose that in
the paradigm case, there had been a sharp change in the market during the last week of
September. According to a delegation member of the United States to the CISG, it can be
argued in two ways. Id. First, after a delay, the offeror arguably can no longer justifiably
regard the delayed communication as "indicating assent to an offer" under Article 18(1)
if intervening events have made the contract unfavorable to the offeree. Id. Second, after
some period of delay, the offeror would not be acting in "good faith" if he treated the
delayed communication as an acceptance in such circumstances. Id. (citing CISG art.
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balance the parties' interests, just as the common law does. 178 The CISG
also mirrors the common law in that it permits the parties to opt out of or
vary the effect of any provisions of the CISG. 179
In conclusion, under both the common law and the CISG, if the
offeror has reason to know that the acceptance has been sent on time, but
it arrives late because of an unforeseen delay in the transmission, the
delayed acceptance is effective unless the offeror promptly informs the
offeree of his intention to retract on account of delay. However, the offeror
is entitled to place the risk of the delay on the offeree by so prescribing in
the offer.
B. Japanese Approach
Because Japan is a civil law system, the most important source of con-
tract law is the Civil Code of Japan.18 0 The approach of the Civil Code of
Japan to a delay in the transmission of an acceptance differs from that of
the common law and the CISG. Unlike the CISG, although similar to the
common law, the Japanese Civil Code considers an acceptance effective
when it is sent. 18 1 However, in contrast to the common law, the Japanese
Civil Code has a provision to deal with the problem of delay in the trans-
mission of acceptance. 182
As under the common law, the Japanese Civil Code generally makes
the acceptance effective when sent. 18 3 However, the Civil Code adds a seri-
ous restriction to this rule, 18 4 providing that where the offer specifies a
time limit for acceptance, the offer shall lapse if the offeror does not receive
notice of acceptance within the specified period. 185 Many arguments can
be seen with respect to the relationship between the provision generally
prescribing the dispatch rule and the provision adding the "serious restric-
tion."18 6 For example, one argument is that arrival is always a condition
precedent for acceptance, but once acceptance has arrived, it becomes
effective retroactively when sent. Another argument is that the contract
forms when acceptance is sent, but that the contract becomes effective
7). The second view treats the problem of speculation in a similar manner to the com-
mon law. See supra Part III.A. In conclusion, the legal consequences of the delay in the
transmission of acceptance are the same under both the common law and the CISG. In
addition, they both depend on the same rationale-the problem of delay in the transmis-
sion of acceptance is governed by the same "general principle" both under the common
law and the CISG. Therefore, Article 21(2) will solve the problem of delay in the trans-
mission of acceptance for the international sales contract, which will be legally effective
in the American legal system.
178. See supra Part II.B.
179. CISG art. 6, supra note 29.
180. See WAGATSUMA, SHINTEI MINPO SOSOKU, supra note 66, at 7.
181. See MINPO art. 526.
182. See MINpO art. 522.
183. See MINPo art. 526.
184. WAGATSUMA, SAIKEN KAKURON, supra note 13, at 64.
185. MINPo art. 521, para 2.
186. WAGATSUMA, SAIKEN KAKURON, supra note 13, at 64-67. See also Shigeru
Kagayama, Win Toitsu Baibai Ho Jo Meibun Kitei no Nai Mondai no Kaiketsu, in RONTEN
KAISETSU KOKusAi TORIHIKI Ho 58 (Satoshi Watanabe & Yoshiaki Nomura eds., 2002).
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when acceptance is received by the offeror. According to the traditionally
accepted theory, however, an acceptance generally becomes effective
already when it is sent, unless the arrival is necessary for the acceptance to
be effective, or if the offer specifies a time limit for acceptance.18 7 Accord-
ing to this view, there exists the problem of delay in the transmission of
acceptance. Similar to the counteroffer theory under the common law, an
acceptance that arrives after the specified period does not form a contract,
though the offeror may treat the late acceptance as a new offer.188 How-
ever, there are some "exceptional situations."' 8 9 Article 522 to the Civil
Code of Japan states that
[e]ven where a notice of acceptance has arrived after the expiration of the
period mentioned in the preceding Article [the period for acceptance which
is specified by the offer], if the offeror could have known that it was dis-
patched at such time that it would have under normal circumstances arrived
within such period, the offeror shall dispatch, without delay to the other
party, a notice of the delayed arrival, unless a notice of the delay has already
been dispatched by him before its arrival. 190
If the offeror has failed to give notice in this case, the notice of accept-
ance shall be "deemed not to have been delayed."'19 1
Comparing this legal rule governing a delay in the transmission of
acceptances under the Civil Code of Japan with those under the common
law and the CISG, one may conclude that the rules governing the problem
of delay in the transmission of acceptances are essentially similar in all
three systems. In all three systems, if the offeror has reason to know that
the acceptance has been sent on time, but it arrives late because of an
unforeseen delay in the transmission, the delayed acceptance is effective
unless the offeror promptly informs the offeree of his intention to retract
on account of delay.
IV. In Search for the Nature of Contract Law
Despite the differences between the American and the Japanese legal
systems, the rules governing the problem of a delay in the transmission of
an acceptance produce similar results in both systems. It is useful to
examine the reasons behind these rules in order to better understand the
nature of contract law and its role in our societies. While examining the
rationale behind these rules, one must consider the source of the rules. In
the Japanese legal system, the source of law is the Diet, that is, the legisla-
187. See id.
188. MINPo art. 523.
189. Similar to the common law approach, the Japanese traditional contract theory
treated the problem of delay in the transmission of acceptance as an "exception" to the
general rules of "late acceptance." See WAGATSUMA, SAIKEN KAKURON, supra note 13, at
62 (finding that when an acceptance arrives after the offer has lapsed, the acceptance
does not create a contract except in certain cases).
190. MINPO art. 522, para 2.
191. MINPO art. 522, para 2.
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ture, which is the "sole law-making organ of the State." 19 2 In the American
legal system, statutory law does not enjoy a similar role. 193 Rather, judicial
decisions create the rule of law.19 4 Therefore, observers seeking the legal
reasoning behind the rule governing a delay in the transmission of accept-
ances should study the Japanese legislature and the American case law. 195
A. Basis for the American Rule Governing Delayed Acceptances
The basis for the rule governing delay in the transmission of an accept-
ance (or an offer) shows the importance of good faith in the American
contract formation process.' 9 6 For example, in Germain, the court
imposed a duty to inquire into the accuracy of the offer price based on the
principle of good faith. 19 7 In Phillips, good faith required the offeror to
inform the offeree of his intention to retract due to delay. 19 8 In the United
States, however, antipathy toward the notion of good faith is apparent.
Commentators have explained that good faith does not apply until the con-
tracting parties have reached an agreement.' 99 These commentators
emphasize that the duty of good faith as embodied in both the UCC and
the Restatement "does not extend to negotiations. ' 20 0 This antipathy
stems from the fear of subverting the "stability of commercial con-
tracts." 20 1 This fear is reflected in the fact that the CISG finds a place for
good faith only in the interpretation of contracts. 20 2
As the preceding paragraph has shown, the concept of good faith in
American contract theory appears to be a duty imposed after a contract is
formed. However, existing contract law has recognized that, in some cases,
the concept of good faith serves as a basis to impose affirmative duties
during the contract formation process. From this point of view, it is not so
surprising to find that the good faith doctrine may require other affirma-
tive duties, such as the duties of disclosure and diligence. 20 3 Professor
192. KENPO [CoNsTITUTION] art. 41 (Japan).
193. JOHN P. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 125 (1980).
194. Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Maine R.R., 67 Mass. 263, 267-268 (1854); see
also supra note 47 and accompanying text.
195. See POUND, JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 51 ("In the common law, the system of law of
the English-speaking world, a statute furnishes a rule for the cases within its purview
but not a principle, a starting point for reasoning as to cases outside its purview, not a
basis for analogical reasoning. For that, in the common-law system, we look to experi-
ence of the administration of justice as shown in the reported decisions of the courts. In
the civil-law system .... the technique in this respect is wholly different. The civilian
reasons by analogy from legislative precepts and regards a fixed course of judicial deci-
sion on some point as establishing that precise point but not as providing a principle. It
does not give a starting point for legal reasoning.") As to the power of the courts in the
Japanese legal system, see KENPO arts. 76, 77, 81. See also SAIBANSHO Ho arts. 3, 10.
196. See Summers, supra note 18, at 197.
197. See Germain Fruit Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 70 P. 658, 659 (Cal. 1902).
198. See Phillips v. Moor, 71 Me. 78, 80 (1880).
199. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 19.
200. See Farnsworth, supra note 155, at 21.
201. Ghestin & Nicholas, supra note 23, at 187.
202. Id; see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 19. One reason is that the common law
states were opposed to applying the principle to the formation of contract.
203. Summers, supra note 18, at 204 n.43.
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Summers has said that "cases have been discovered which... require good
faith at every stage of the contractual process, from preliminary negotia-
tion through performance to discharge, and in nearly all kinds of con-
tracts."'204 With respect to the role of good faith in the CISG, note that a
member of the U.S. delegation to the CISG argued that the CISG should
apply good faith to avoid an unjust result in the contract formation pro-
cess.20 5 From these perspectives, good faith is of "great significance in
contractual contexts," commercial or noncommercial. 20 6 Assuming that
contract theory is an interpretation of existing contract common law rules
and principles,20 7 one must reexamine existing contract theory in order to
properly interpret existing contract law, in which good faith should be of
great significance at every stage of the contractual process. 20 8
The notion of good faith also exists in Japanese contract theory. In
Japan, good faith is a notion that "governs the law of obligation," including
the contract formation process, at least in theory. 20 9 Yet, interestingly, the
Civil Code of Japan, which contains the general contract law, does not refer
to the application of good faith in contract negotiations. 210 The Civil Code
of Japan states that the exercise of rights and performance of duties must
be done in accordance with the principles of good faith and fair dealing. 211
Even before the principle of good faith appeared in a legislative provision,
the notion existed that good faith should govern every stage of the contrac-
tual process, from preliminary negotiation, to performance, to dis-
charge.212 Even the Supreme Court of Japan has found that duties are
based on the principle of good faith throughout the contractual process. 213
Even though court decisions are less influential in the Japanese legal sys-
tem, 214 one may conclude at the least that the fact that the Civil Code does
not explicitly extend the duty of good faith to negotiations is not necessa-
rily conclusive. 215 One could argue that American contract law may recog-
nize a more extensive role for the notion of good faith because it is the case
204. Id. It continues: "This is not to say that all cases agree as to when a duty of good
faith should be imposed, for they do not." Id.
205. See Farnsworth, supra note 155, at 194.
206. Summers, supra note 18, at 197.
207. As to the relationship between the existing contract law and the existing contract
theory in the United States, see UCHIDA, supra note 118, at 147-48 (1990) (citing RON-
ALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPiRE 45 (1986)).
208. This does not mean that the solution is unacceptable to the existing American
contract theory. Rather, the solution may be more suitable within the culture of existing
contract theory, since the solution does not "subvert" but serves to "preserve" the "sta-
bility" or security of commercial transactions. See infra notes 259-263.
209. WAGATSUMA, SHINTEI SAIKEN SORON, supra note 21, at 14.
210. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
211. MINPO art. 1.
212. See WAGATSUMA, SHINTEI SAIKEN SORON, supra note 21.
213. See Decision of Sept. 18, 1984, Supreme Court, (o)No. 159, 1137 HANREIJIHO 51
(1984); Kudo v. Nation, 29 MINSHU 143 (1975).
214. See supra notes 234, 237 and accompanying text.
215. Cf. supra note 201; see also Ikeda, 1137 HANREI JiHo 51 (1984) (affirming the
"liability in a contract preparation stage for the reason of the breach of duty of care
based on the principle of good faith").
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law that recognizes the duty of good faith in the contract formation pro-
cess. 2 16 The difference between the American legal system and the Japa-
nese legal system may be the interpretation of the laws and not differences
in the laws themselves.
The principle of good faith consequently has a "function of almost
almighty provision" in the Japanese legal system, compared to the Ameri-
can legal system.2 17 From this perspective, one might think that America
and Japan have similar reasons for the solution to the problem of delay in
the contract formation process. Surprisingly, however, the reason in the
Japanese legal system differs from the reason in the American legal system.
B. Basis for the Japanese Rule Governing Delayed Acceptances
To find the policy underlying the Japanese rule governing delayed
acceptances, one must look to legislative history, which explains: 2 18
Without a provision like an Article 522, the offeror needs to do nothing
when the acceptance has been delayed due to the unforeseen delay in its
transmission, and the result of delayed acceptance is no formation of con-
tract. In the case of unforeseen delay in the transmission of acceptance,
however, the acceptor would [reasonably] believe that the acceptance has
been arrived [sic] at the offeror in a timely manner so that the acceptor
would not doubt that the contract would be formed. Thus, the acceptor will
come to incur unexpected damage if the acceptor does not receive any notice
of delay. Without a provision like Article 522, therefore, it is not possible to
preserve the security or stability of [commercial] transactions.2 19
The Statement of Reasons, the legislative history, refers to the law of obliga-
tion in another jurisdiction, which prescribes that an offeror who fails to
make a notice of delay shall be liable for damages. 220 However, the State-
ment suggests that it "takes time and trouble to claim damage, and [that] it
will be [of] no utility if he cannot afford to claim."2 2 1
Thus, Article 522 protects the acceptor by establishing a kind of virtual real-
ity. However, in order to protect the acceptor, the offeror should not incur
unexpected damage. In the end, the offeror escapes from sanction if he dis-
patches a notice of delayed arrival, even without inquiring whether or not
the notice actually arrived at the acceptor.
22 2
We may conclude that the Japanese Civil Code reached its solution
based on economic analysis, instead of the principle of good faith. 22 3 The
216. See supra notes 179-186 and accompanying text.
217. See UCHIDA, supra note 118, at 250.
218. See supra notes 191-194 and accompanying text.
219. The Civil Code Draft Amendment Statement of Reasons, supra note 17, at
502-03.
220. See id.
221. See id. at 503.
222. Id.
223. It is possible to argue that the notion of good faith is not recognized when Article
522 was inserted. See WAGATSuMA, SHINTEI SAIKEN SORON, supra note 21. Yet, it is cer-
tain that the legislature referred to economic needs instead of a "morally" charged con-
cept such as the principle of good faith as its reason for inserting the Article. Cf. supra
notes 151-157 and accompanying text.
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basis for the Japanese rule reasoning conforms more closely to the tradi-
tional view of American contract theory, which has a "close historical rela-
tionship with the free market as envisioned by classical economic
theory. '2 24 Indeed, an American court stated that the security or stability
of commercial transactions is "so vital to the smooth and efficient opera-
tion of the modern American economy. '2 25 Also, American contract the-
ory has somewhat of an antipathy to the extension of the principle of good
faith into other areas of contract law.22 6 Because of the bargain theory of
consideration, American contract law protects only those kinds of con-
tracts which are the "driving force of American capitalism society.
2 2 7
Indeed, the spirit of the common law of contracts reflects "[tihe need of
stability and certainty in the maturity of law and the importance of the
social interests in security of acquisitions and security of transactions in a
commercial and industrial society."'22 8 Such economic notions are not the
legal reason for the solution to the problem of delay in the transmission of
acceptances in Japan, where the law governing the commercial transac-
tions has its own "guiding principle" discrete from the general law of con-
tracts.2 29 Here, as we have seen, the principle of good faith constitutes the
"supreme notion" of the general law of contracts. 2 30
C. The Nature of Contract Law as It Appears in the Solution to the
Problem of Delay in the Contract Formation Process
The foregoing analysis will contribute significantly to legal theory in
two ways: First, this Article's solution is sustainable even within the eco-
nomic culture of existing American contract theory. As we have seen,
scholars and courts are opposed to extending the application of good faith
to the contract formation process because they fear doing so would subvert
the stability of commercial transactions. 23 1 Yet, the policy underlying the
Japanese solution shows that the solution does not subvert, but rather pre-
serves the stability of commercial transactions. 23 2 Thus, this Article's
solution is sustainable even within an economically-oriented contract the-
ory. It must be remembered, however, that American law provides the
solution by referring to the notion of good faith, instead of the economic
notion.2 33 Therefore, secondly, one must reconsider the nature of contract
law, at least as a matter of legal theory, which has the role of "interpreting"
the existing law.2
3 4
224. GILMORE, supra note 18, at 7-8.
225. General Motors Co. v. Piskor, 381 A.2d. 16, 22 (Md. 1977).
226. See supra notes 200-203 and accompanying text.
227. HIGUcHI, supra note 24, at 18.
228. RoscOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 148 (1921).
229. See WAGATSUMA, SHINTEI MINPO Sosolu, supra note 66, at 2-6.
230. See supra notes 21, 212, 215 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 200-206 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 221-231 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 152-158 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 200-206
and accompanying text; cf. supra note 226 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
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Law is a "social artifact with immense practical importance,"23 5 and
contract law is no exception. Therefore, the "objective" of law, according to
Plato, is as follows:
[It] is not the welfare of any particular class, but of the whole community. It
uses persuasion or forces to unite all citizens and make them share together
the benefits which each individually can confer on the community; and its
purpose in fostering this attitude is not to enable anyone to please himself,
but to make each man a link in the unity of the whole.
23 6
It is therefore the role of contract law to channel the parties' wants to
serve the objectives of the community.2 37 Contracting parties pursue their
individual interests, which are originally antagonistic, but end up serving
the objectives of the community because their cooperative activity effi-
ciently allocates limited resources and realizes a well-ordered society. 23 8
235. See ATiYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 419.
236. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC bk. VII, at 519-20 (H.D.P. Lee trans., 1955).
237. See POUND, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 1, at 31-32. Pound stated:
[W]e shall see in these theor[ies] a picture of a system of ordering human con-
duct and adjusting human relations resting upon the ultimate basis and derived
therefrom by the absolute process. In other words, they all picture, not merely
an ordering of human conduct and adjustment of human relations, which we
have actually given, but something more which we should like to have, namely, a
doing of these things in a fixed, absolutely predetermined way, excluding all
merely individual feelings or desires of those by whom the ordering and adjust-
ment are carried out. Thus in these subconscious picturings of the end of law it
seems to be conceived as existing to satisfy a paramount social want of general
security.
Id.; see also ATIYAH, supra note 75, at 12. Atiyah stated:
[A]ll legal obligations are, in the last resort, obligations created or at least recog-
nized by the law, but the classical model of contract is easily enough adjusted to
take account of this truism. The law of contract, it is said, consists of power-
conferring rules. The law provides facilities for private parties to make use of if
they so wish. Those who wish to create legal obligations have only to comply
with a simple set of rules and the result will be recognized by the law. The
function of the law itself in all this is largely neutral in a moral and a distributive
sense.
Id.; see also id. at 83. Atiyah stated:
[W]e often imply the promise because we think there ought to be an obligation,
not the other way around. Calling the obligation promissory then seems to legit-
imate the imposition of the obligation by invoking 'neutral' moral principles, but
in reality 'we' feel-or must of us do-that there should be an obligation in this
situation because of many of our basic presuppositions about liberalism, free-
dom, and the individual's role in society.
238. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776), quoted in PAUL A. SAMUELSON &
WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 36 (14th ed. 1992). Smith stated:
[Every individual] generally neither intends to promote the public interest, nor
knows how much he is promoting it. He intends only his own security, only his
own gain. And he is in this led by an invisible hand to promote an end which
was no part of his intention. By pursuing his own interest he frequently pro-
motes that of society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.
Id.; see also Summers, supra note 18 at 198 (stating that "in one sense [the contracting
parties'] interests will remain essentially antagonistic"); ATIYAH, supra note 75, at 5
("[C]ontract law [is] 'about' fairly broad areas of... co-operative activity .... In particu-
lar, we find the three elements of consent, reciprocity of benefit, and reliance as key
elements in much co-operative activity.") (emphasis and quotation marks omitted);
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With respect to the contract as an efficient allocator of limited resources for
the community, consider the city of New York.
without a constant flow of goods into and out of the city, New Yorkers
would be on the verge of starvation within a week .... [Mlany kinds of
goods and services must be provided. From the surrounding counties, from
50 states, and from the far corners of the world, goods travel for days and
months with New York as their destination.
23 9
How is it that 10 million people can sleep easily at night, without liv-
ing in mortal terror of a breakdown in the elaborate economic processes
upon which the city's existence depends? The surprising answer is that
these economic activities are coordinated without coercion or centralized
direction by anybody through the market. 240 Due to its flow of more accu-
rate information, a market-based economy more efficiently allocates goods
and services to private parties than does a command economy driven by
remote state officials.2 4 1 Free economic transactions through the market
are considered to be superior to the command economy because they dis-
tribute limited resources more efficiently. 2 42
The principle of good faith has a "pervasive and distinctive relevance"
to the cooperative relationship between the contracting parties in commer-
cial and noncommercial contexts.24 3 Because of the nature of contractual
relationships, it is natural for two parties to assume that each will act in
good faith toward the other throughout the course of their contractual deal-
ings.24 4 It is a "jural postulate of civilized society, that in such a society
men must be able to assume that those with whom they deal in the general
intercourse of society will act in good faith." 24 5 Similar notions of good
faith can, of course, be seen in Japan, in which the principle of good faith is
the "supreme notion" governing the entire field of contract law.24 6 From
this perspective, it is not so surprising to find that "good faith" may require
affirmative action. 247 As the parties may be strangers, there are no similar
duties outside of contract law to protect the parties from each other. 248
Once a "contractual" relation has begun, however, each party owes certain
POUND, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 1, at 136 ("Law did not concern itself at first with agree-
ments or breaches of agreements. Its function was to keep the peace by regulating or
preventing private war and this only required it to deal with personal violence and with
disputes over the possession of property."); ROBERT S. SUMMERS, ON GIVING FORM ITS
DUE-AN ESSAY IN LEGAL THEORY (forthcoming) (manuscript at ch. 8) [hereinafter SUM-
MERS, FORM]
239. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 238, at 42.
240. Id. at 36.
241. See SUMMERS, supra note 238 (manuscript at 32-33).
242. See HIGUCHI, supra note 24, at 18.
243. See Summers, supra note 18, at 197.
244. See id.
245. See POUND, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 1, at 133.
246. See WAGATSUMA, SHINTEI SAIKEN SORON, supra note 21, at 208, 210; text accompa-
nying note 19.
247. See Summers, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
248. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 I-HRv.
L. REV. 1685, 1728-29 (1976).
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duties to the other party.24 9 For example, in Germain, the "duty to
inquire" protected the offeror from losing money by enforcing the sale of
oranges at the mistaken price, and by forcing the offeree to ascertain the
true intention of the offeror.2 50 In Phillips, the "duty to speak" protected
the offeree by preventing the further cost of meaningless preparation for
performance. 25 1 These duties arising from contractual relations are based
on the principle of good faith and are "significantly the product of interests
independent of the parties' promises."
25 2
Viewing the ends of law more systematically, it has been explained
that there are two purposes of law: the maintenance of social order and the
realization of justice. 253 Assuming that the maintenance of social order is
equivalent to legal certainty, there is a "relation of tension" between justice
and legal certainty.2 54 For example, legal certainty tends to demand stabil-
ity in law, while justice may require that the legal solution be reached on a
case-by-case basis, and so the solutions required to achieve these ends may
contradict each other.25 5 This contradiction in law seems to be the basis
for the fear that the application of good faith may subvert the security or
stability of commercial transactions. 25 6 Indeed, good faith is the "legal
resource" necessary to do justice, and justice demands that stability or cer-
tainty be disregarded in certain cases.2 57 In a case of delay in the transmis-
sion of acceptance, however, both good faith and the security or stability of
transactions require the same solution. The solutions to the problem of
delay in the transmission of acceptances in both America and Japan seem
to reflect a common purpose.
249. See Hillman, supra note 14, at 658; see also WAGATSUMA, SAIKEN KAKURON, supra
note 13, at 33-42.
250. See Germain Fruit Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 70 P. 658, 659 (Cal. 1902).
251. See Phillips v. Moor, 71 Me. 78 (1880).
252. Hillman, supra note 14, at 658 n.251.
253. The nature of law and the ends of law "ha[ve] been the chief battle ground of
jurisprudence, since the Greek philosophers." See POUND, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 1, at
25. It would not be possible to restate all the arguments here, but it is possible, at least,
to consider Plato and Aristotle, the "founders" of Western philosophy. See WAYNE MOR-
RISON, JURISPRUDENCE: FROM THE GREEKS TO POST-MODERNISM, 26 (1997). The idea of
maintaining social order through law is fully developed in Plato. See PLATO, supra note
236. Aristotle, however, seemed to focus on justice in NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at
116-47 (Terence Irwin trans., 1985). See POUND, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 1, at 35-39.
Law in Japan also aims to maintain social order and justice. See AKIRA YAMADA, HOGAKU
69-78 (1964).
254. GUSTAV RADBRUCH, THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF 1..ASK, RADBRUCH, AND DABIN 109
n.3. (Kurt Wilk trans., 1950); see also YAMADA, supra note 253, at 69-78, 101-06.
255. See RADBRUCH, supra note 254, at 109-110.
256. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 19, § 4.1. Farnsworth explained:
On the side of enforcing the bargain as made stand the policies favoring the
autonomy of the parties, the protection of justified expectations, and the stabil-
ity of transactions. On the other side stand the policies favoring the prevention
of unfairness and the protection of the parties from overreaching. No single
formula has evolved to reconcile these competing policies, and often the factors
that contribute to a particular decision can be separated, if at all, only with
difficulty.
Id. § 7.17 (stating that good faith is "based on fundamental notions of fairness").
257. Cf. Summers, supra note 18.
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Conclusion
The analysis of the problem of delay in the transmission of accept-
ances provides several interesting issues both to comparative studies and to
legal theory. The analysis demonstrates that the legal structure of the con-
tract formation process in the American legal system differs profoundly
from that in the Japanese legal system. American contract law emphasizes
the identity of each contracting party as a "master of the offer" and the
"casting voter," while Japanese contract law views them "symmetrically."
Based on these differences, each legal system has developed its own legal
rules and principles governing the contract formation process. The com-
parative method helps one understand these rules and principles in that it
enables a systematic explanation of these separate rules and principles.
Finally, the American and the Japanese legal systems differ in their method-
ology for finding solutions to legal problems.
Despite these differences, the analysis shows that the American legal
system and the Japanese legal system reach a similar solution to the prob-
lem of delay in the transmission of acceptances: if the offeror has reason to
know that the acceptance has been sent on time, but it arrives late because
of an unforeseen delay in transmission, the delayed acceptance is effective
unless the offeror promptly informs the offeree of his intention to retract
on account of delay. Curiously, the reasoning by which the common law
reached the solution conforms to the traditional view of Japanese legal rea-
soning, and the reasoning by which the Japanese Civil Code reached the
solution conforms to the traditional view of American common law. The
difference in reasons leads us to a more fundamental inquiry of legal the-
ory: what is the nature of contract law?
The original concern of this Article was the practical and technical
problem of delay in the contract formation process. In order to understand
the present situation and to find a solution to the problem, it is necessary
to address more fundamental questions, such as the legal structure of the
contract formation process and the nature of contract law itself. In finding
the problem and its solution, the comparative method will "enhance under-
standing of the nature of law itself."'2 58 This Article has hopefully made
some contribution both to legal theory and to comparative studies.
258. See ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 418.
Vol. 37
